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I. INTRODUCTION
Most modern aircraft as well as other complex machinery
is equipped with diagnostics systems for its major subsystems.
During operation, sensors provide important information about
the subsystem (e.g., the engine) and that information is used to
detect and diagnose faults. Typically, FDDR (fault detection,
diagnosis, and recovery) or IVHM (Integrated Vehicle Health
Management) systems are used for this purpose.
Most of these systems focus on the monitoring of a mechan-
ical, hydraulic, or electromechanical subsystem of the vehicle
or machinery. Only recently, health management systems that
monitor software have been developed (for an overview see,
e.g., [1]). In this paper, we will discuss our approach of using
Bayesian networks for Software Health Management (SWHM)
[2], [3], [4].
The field of system health management for hardware is
quite mature; many industrial systems use diagnostics/IVHM
systems (e.g., automotive or aerospace industry). However, the
health management of software has to adhere to substantially
different requirements. The most striking difference is that
faults in a software system usually occur instantaneously,
whereas faults in hardware systems tend to develop over time
(e.g., an oil leak). 1 Furthermore, many software problems are
caused by problematic software-hardware interactions, which
means that both the software and the hardware must be
monitored.
At the same time, software has features that might make
system health monitoring easier and more promising in some
ways. First, software redundancy does not increase the weight
of a system, while hardware redundancy clearly does. Second,
software can be debugged and fixed remotely, without need
for human presence at the location where the system (say, a
robotic vehicle on Mars) is deployed.
1This is a rule of thumb, with exceptions. A memory leak, for example, is
a type of software fault that develops over time and as such is a an exception
to our rule.
Based on the brief discussion above, it is clear that software
has several unique features that makes a dedicated research
and development effort worthwhile. At the same time, it is
also important to utilize and extend existing results from the
area of system health management. In our SWHM approach,
briefly presented here and discussed in more detail elsewhere
[2], [3], [4], we are using Bayesian networks [5], [6] to define
the health model for the software to be monitored. In the
rest of this extended abstract, we will first discuss SWHM
requirements, which make advanced reasoning capabilities for
the detection and diagnosis important. Then we will present,
on a high level, how our Bayesian models are constructed.
II. SWHM REQUIREMENTS
Traditional FDDR and IVHM systems are tied to the indi-
vidual components or subsystems they monitor. Based upon
sensor readings, such a system tries to detect, for a component
or subsystem, anomalous behavior and if such behavior is
found, produces a diagnostics message. While in many cases
such an approach is reliable, adverse effects that have been
caused by the interaction between different subsystems or
components cannot be captured properly. A typical example
is a recent incident on a Qantas A380. When one of the
engines exploded during flight, taking out the hydraulic sys-
tem and damaging the wing, the pilots had to sort though
literally hundreds of diagnostic messages in order to find
out what happened. In addition, several diagnostic messages
contradicted each other2. If the diagnostics had been system-
wide, the number of warnings (and thus the pilot’s workload)
could have been reduced tremendously and no contradictory
diagnostic messages would have been produced. Furthermore,
emergent behavior can only be detected if information from
all subsystems can be taken into consideration.
The problem of interaction between components or subsys-
tem, as discussed above, is an subclass of a broader class
of problems: A specific set of observations could have been
caused by a number of different, potentially contradictory
2http://www.aerosocietychannel.com/aerospace-insight/2010/12/
exclusive-qantas-qf32-flight-from-the-cockpit/
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110015016 2019-08-30T17:01:16+00:00Z
faults. The SWHM should be able to distinguish those and
provide a metric on how confident the SWHM is that a certain
fault has actually occurred.
Many approaches to diagnostics and IVHM use discrete
models and do not properly account for sensor failure; di-
agnostic messages are often produced using table-driven or
fault-tree based mechanisms. The input of such systems are
most often discretized sensor values (e.g., pressure low, pres-
sure hi) and the reasoning uses one or more “firing” diagnostic
rules. However, those approaches usually do not take into
account that sensors, which produce the input to the IVHM,
might return noisy data or can be broken altogether. Advanced
SWHM, however, should be able to reason about sensor
reliability and quality of sensor data.
Finally, for real-time and embedded systems there are
requirements for SWHM, like other types of system health
management, to have predictable and short execution times
and not use much memory [7]. A more general requirement
is ease of modelling, either by supporting machine learning
or automated Bayesian network construction from a domain-
specific language.
III. BAYESIAN NETWORKS FOR SWHM
Bayesian networks are an approach to represent multi-
variate probability distributions in a compact manner such
that they are amendable to learning and inference [5], [6].
In our recent work, we have successfully compiled Bayesian
networks to arithmetic circuits. These arithmetic circuits are
then used to perform, by an on-line evaluator, system health
management functions including detection and diagnosis.
In our SWHM approach, we use Bayesian networks to
model software [2]. Our modelling of software is inspired
by previous work on system health management for electrical
power systems, in which each electrical power system com-
ponent is represented by a small number of nodes (typically
2-6), and then separate Bayesian networks structures represent
the connections between components. In a similar way, each
software component is in our approach represented by a
small number of nodes, one of which represents the “health
status” of the software. Currently, we have initial results
for software for small satellites, specifically for a simplified
aircraft guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) system
implemented using the OSEK3 embedded operating system
[2]. Using scenarios with injected faults, we have shown that
that our SWHM approach using Bayesian networks is able to
detect and diagnose software faults.
In our demonstration, we have implemented the SWHM
concept using Bayesian networks, which hare model software
as well as interfacing hardware sensors. Of particular interest
to us is that this approach can fuse information from different
layers of the software stack, from firmware to operating
systems and application software. After compilation to arith-
metic circuits, Bayesian networks are well-suited for on-line
3We are currently using the Trampoline implementation of OSEK—see
http://trampoline.rts-software.org for details.
execution in embedded software systems found in vehicles
(aircraft, spacecraft, and cars) or mobile devices (cell phones,
tablets, etc.)
IV. CONCLUSION
Software plays an important and increasing role in aircraft
and other complex machinery. Unfortunately, software can fail
in spite of extensive verification and validation efforts. In this
paper, we discuss a Software Health Management (SWHM)
approach to tackle problems associated with software bugs
and failures. We have briefly presented a SWHM system that
can help to perform fault detection and diagnosis in embedded
systems, using Bayesian networks as the underlying modeling
paradigm. In these networks, we concisely capture and fuse
information from hardware sensors, software status signals,
software quality signals, and information from the operating
system. Given these data, Bayesian reasoning can compute
the most likely causes of failures, if present, and also give a
statistically sound measure for the quality (probability) of the
answer.
System health models in the form of Bayesian networks
can be compiled into efficient arithmetic circuits, which
yield a high-performance SWHM and are suitable for exe-
cution within embedded (on-board) software systems, and are
amenable to V&V [8].
Furthermore, software tools for Bayesian modeling and
compilation into arithmetic circuits—such as SamIam4 and
Ace5—are readily available.
In this abstract, we only covered a small range of a SWHM
system’s capabilities. Current work investigates, how informa-
tion on the quality of a computation (e.g., numerical quality or
quality of the state estimation) can be smoothly incorporated
into the SWHM. Research on hierarchical SWHMs will ad-
dress the issue of detecting complicated software-hardware in-
teractions for large- and extreme-scale BNs [9], and will focus
on the fusion of multiple information streams for the purpose
of increasing diagnostic accuracy. can deal with unexpected
and unmodeled failures (e.g., due to unforeseen environmental
circumstances) and emerging behavior. Bayesian networks
have, due to their modeling capabilities, its efficient execution,
and high reasoning power, to find their way into on-board
software health management.
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